# SPECTER security and signed-release policy

## Reality of this first historical vault

The archives here are **original user-provided full-project ZIP snapshots**. Their ZIP bytes are copied without modification and recorded with SHA-256. No authenticated official release manifests, independently pinned Ed25519 public key triplet, or three signatures were available in the earlier archives.

Therefore every historical item is **LEGACY-UNSIGNED**, not a cryptographically frozen official release. A SHA-256 value delivered by the same website as its archive is a useful integrity check, but cannot prove who uploaded it. The ZIP member modification times, sometimes all identical, are *not authenticated release dates*. Do not infer release time from them.

The three future signing roles are **PHANTOM**, **CIPHER**, and **SENTINEL**. A later authenticated official release will require all three *different* Ed25519 signatures over precisely the same canonical signed manifest. Missing one key blocks authorization. Revisions require a *new CL version*, never an in-place revision of an already signed version. An authorized key rotation would also need approval under the prior three-key policy.

The private keys must not be bundled with a release or pasted into a web page. The provided local Python signer supports encrypted OpenSSH Ed25519 private keys and requires separate explicit file paths to all three. It produces public keys and 64-byte raw Ed25519 signatures for review.

## Authentication and freeze limitations

An administrator can technically replace files in a Cloudflare or GitHub account. Real enforcement means **independent pinning of the three public keys** or fingerprints in a trusted client or separate update channel. If someone can replace the site, its JavaScript, its trust list, and its archived ZIPs simultaneously, that website alone cannot provide an immutable chain of custody.

A new signed release must be checked by an independently trusted verifier, not only by code served from the same mutable website. The browser SHA-256 verification UI is not represented as a signing verification for unsigned archives. The Python `TOOLS/verify_vault.py` program checks every preserved ZIP and verifies all three Ed25519 signatures where signed manifests and pinned public keys exist.

## Offline tools

- `python3 TOOLS/verify_vault.py` — audits every ZIP checksum and validates signed entries (if any).
- `python3 TOOLS/verify_vault.py --require-signed` — intentionally fails while historical archives remain unsigned.
- `python3 -m pip install cryptography` — optional dependency to use the offline signer and signature verification.
- `python3 TOOLS/sign_release.py --manifest NEW_MANIFEST.json --archive NEW_ARCHIVE.zip --phantom /private/path/PHANTOM --cipher /private/path/CIPHER --sentinel /private/path/SENTINEL --out /safe/new/signing-output` — signs a proposed, unsigned future release, with passphrases requested locally.

No key-generation website is required, and no real keys or signatures were invented in this package.

## Adding signed versions in the future

`TOOLS/create_signed_successor.py` creates the next version by requiring all three encrypted Ed25519 private keys, copying exactly one *new* source ZIP, signing its immutable manifest and generating another full Cloudflare Pages deployment ZIP. It does not change any old version ZIP bytes. A new version's ZIP filename receives the actual signing event UTC timestamp, rather than a timestamp inferred from ZIP member metadata.
